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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the problem of secure communication over wiretap multicast networks. Noticing that 
network coding renders the intermediate nodes to mix information from different data flows, we propose a secure 
communication scheme based on cryptographic means and network coding. Specifically, we employ a confidential 
cryptosystem to encrypt the source message packets, then treat the secret key as a message packet and mix the key 
with the obtained cryptograms. Furthermore, we can prove that, under suitable conditions, the wiretapper is unable to 
gain the secret key. Meanwhile, the confidential cryptosystem prohibits the wiretapper from extracting meaningful 
information from the obtained cryptograms. Our scheme doesn't need a private channel to transmit the secret key and 
enables the utilization of network capacity to reach 1nn
− .
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Preliminaries 
There have been research efforts on achieving secure network coding shortly after network coding was 
introduced in [1]. The problem of secure communication based on network coding over a wiretap network 
was first explored by Cai and Yeung in [2], then they further developed their method in paper [9]. In 
paper [4], Silva and Kschischang proposed a coding scheme to achieve security on wiretap network via 
encoding the source message by coset code depending on maximum rank distance (MRD) code. The 
scheme discussed in [7] is based on mixing the original raw information symbols with a vector of 
uniformly distributed random symbols of the same length. Although Adeli et al. [6] presented a secure 
communication scheme based on hash function, it didn't prove that they can prevent the wiretapper from 
getting the random data packet. 
The main idea of this paper originates from the following observation that network coding allows the 
intermediate nodes in a network to mix different data flows through algebraic combinations of multiple 
datagrams. On a multicast network, the sender can transmit n  message packets to each sink. We employ a 
confidential cryptosystem (whose cryptogram space and message space are the same) to encrypt 1n −
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message packets 1 2 1, , , nx x x −" , and obtain cryptograms 1 2 1, , nc c c −" . However, the secret key k  can be 
treated as a message packet. Intuitively, utilizing network coding, the intermediate nodes can mix the 
secret key k  with the obtained cryptograms, and prevents the wiretapper from gaining the secret key k .
And the confidential cryptosystem will prohibit the wiretapper from extracting meaningful information 
from the cryptograms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly review some notions and 
the model of CSWN. Then we illustrate our secure communication scheme on a CSWN in section III. In 
section IV, we deliver an example to demonstrate the application of our results. Finally, section V 
contains our conclusions. 
2. Preliminaries 
A multicast communication network (in which a single sender wants to transmit the same message 
packets to all receivers) is a collection of directed links connecting transmitter, switchers and receivers. It 
can be represented by a finite acyclic graph ( , )G V E=  with multiple edges whose vertex v V∈  is called 
the node and edge ( , )e u v=  is called channel. The head and tail of an edge ( , )e u v=  are denoted by 
( )v H e=  and ( )u T e= , respectively. The sets of edges that end and originating at vertex v V∈  are 
defined by ( ) { : ( ) }I v e E H e vΓ = ∈ =  and ( ) { : ( ) }O v e E T e vΓ = ∈ = , respectively. In the following, we 
assume that each channel transmits one packet per unit time without interference and loss. 
The vertex s  is the source node at which message packets generated. The subset 1 2{ , , }DV t t tμ= "  of 
nodes whose members are called sinks. The maximum flow from source node s  to the sink it  is denoted 
by ( , )imaxflow s t  for 1,2, ,i μ= " . We denote min{ ( , ) : 1, ,in maxflow s t i= = " }μ . Let 
1 2( , , , )nX X X"   be the n  random variables that are observable at source node s . The message packet 
generated by random variable iX  is a vector 
F ri qx ∈ , where Fq  is a finite field and r  is a positive 
integer. 
Since linear network coding is sufficient for us to express the essence of our approach, we confine our 
discussion to linear network coding in the rest of this paper. In the following, we employ the definition of 
linear network codes from [3]. 
Definition 1: Let 
Fq  be a finite field, an n-dimensional 
Fq  valued network code on an acyclic 
communication network ( , )G V E=  consists of scalars , Fd e qk ∈  (where ,e d E∈  and ( ) ( )H d T e= ) and 
n-dimensional vectors ef  for all e E∈  such that 
1) ,
( ( ))I
e d e d
d T e
k
∈Γ
= ∑f f  where ( ( ))Oe H d∈Γ
2) The vectors ef  for the n  imaginary channels ( )Oe s∈Γ  form the natural basis of vector space 
(F )nq .
The vector ef  is called the global encoding kernel of  channel e E∈ .
Building on the above notions, the source message generated at source node s  are denoted by an 
n − dimensional vector 1 2( , , , )nx x x=x "  where F ri qx ∈  for 1,2, ,i n= " . Therefore, the packet 
transmitted on channel e  is denoted by ( ) ee =Y xf . For a subset B E⊆ , ( ) ( ( ) : )B e e B= ∈Y Y  is the set 
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of packets transmitted by channels in B  and the matrix whose columns are global encoding kernels of 
channels in B  is denoted by ( )BF . Let 1 2, , , pα α α"  be the Fq  linear space spanned by 
vectors 1 2, , , pα α α" .
A communication system on a wiretap network (CSWN) is composed of directed multigraph 
( , )G V E=  and a collection 1 2{ , , , }NW W W W= "  which is a set comprising of subsets of channels. We 
assume that the wiretapper knows the encoding scheme, he/she can choose one (but only one) wiretap set 
iW W∈  and fully obtain the packets transmitted on channels in iW . Meanwhile the sender knows the 
collection W  but can not be sure which element in W  is eavesdropped by the wiretapper. 
3. Secure Communication on Wiretap Networks 
On a wiretap multicast network ( , )G V E= , let minn = { ( , ) : 1, , }imaxflow s t i μ= " . There are n-1
message packets 1 1, , F rn qx x − ∈"  generated at source node s . Here we employ a confidential 
cryptosystem. The secret key is 1( , , ) (F )
l
l qk k k= ∈"  and 1 1, , F rn qc c − ∈"  are the crypto- grams of 
1 1, , nx x −" , respectively. It is reasonable to assume that l r< . Then we write  
1( , , ,1,0, ,0) (F )
r
l qk k k= ∈" " . In this way, the secret key k  can be treated as a message packet in  F rq .
Then we build the message vector m  as 
1 2 1( , , , , )nk c c c −=m " .
It is obviously that the wiretapper cannot obtain meaningful information about the source message 
packets if we can prevent he/she from getting the secret key k . It is easy to see that if 
(1,0, ,0) { : }e ie W∉ ∈f"                                                         (1) 
holds for each wiretap set iW W∈ , then the wiretapper has no access to the key k . For each wiretap 
set iW W∈ , if there exists an integer (1 )i i in n λ≤ ≤  such that 
1 2 1, , , , ( ), , ( )i in i iW Wλε ε ε f f" "
is linearly independent (where 1{ ( ), , ( )}ii iW Wλ"f f  is a maximal linearly independent set of 
{ : }e ie W∈f  and iε  be an -n dimensional column vector whose i-th coordinate is 1 and all other 
components are zero), then (1,0, ,0) { :e e∉ ∈f" }iW .
For each wiretap set iW W∈ , 1{ ( ), , ( )}ii iW Wλf f"  be a maximal subset of linearly independent 
vectors in { : }e ie W∈f . We can prove that, under suitable conditions, if there exists an integer 
(1 )i i in n n λ≤ ≤ −  such that 1 2 1, , , , ( ), ,in iWε ε ε f" " ( )i iWλf  is linearly independent for each wiretap set 
iW W∈ , then secure communication on the CSWN is achievable. 
For every wiretap set iW W∈ , let 1( )iWF  and 2 ( )iWF  be the submatrices of ( )iWF  comprising of its 
first in  rows and last in n−  rows, respectively. Let ( ) ( )i iW W=Y mF , 1( )iWY 1 1 1( , , , ) ( )in ik c c W−= F"
and 2 1 2( ) ( , , ) ( )ii n n iW c c W−= "Y F . It is manifestly that 1 2( ) ( ) ( )i i iW W W= +Y Y Y . The matrices 
1946  Zhanghua Cao et al. / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 1943 – 1950
Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
1( ), ( )i iW WF F  and 2 ( )iWF  can be regarded as linear transformations mapping 1 1, ( , , , )ink c c −m "  and 
1( , , )in nc c −"  into 1 1 1( ), ( , , , ) ( )ii n iW k c c W−mF F"  and  1 2( , , ) ( )in n ic c W−" F , and denote their imagine 
space by 1,L L  and 2L , respectively. Next, let see a useful lemma. 
Lemma 1: On a wiretap multicast network ( , )G V E= , the collection of sets of wiretap channels is 
1 2{ , , , }NW W W W= " . The message vector is 1 2 1( , , , , )nk c c c −=m " . For each wiretap set iW W∈ , if 
2( ( )) ( ( ))i i irank W rank W λ= =F F  and random variable 2 1 2( ) ( , , ) ( )ii n n iW c c W−= "Y F  has uniform 
distribution, then the wiretapper can not obtain any meaningful information about the secret key k .
Proof: Since 2( ( )) ( ( ))i i irank W rank W λ= =F F  and 2L ⊆ L , then 2L L= . The random variable 
2 ( )iWY  is uniformly distributed over 2L . Thus, for each 2 2L∈y , we have 2 2Pr{ ( ) } ( ) iriW q λ−= =Y y . On 
the other hand,  
1 1
2 1
Pr{ ( ) | ( ) }
Pr{ ( ) }
( ) i
i i
i
r
W W
W
q λ−
= =
= = −
=
Y y Y y
Y y y
It follows that 
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
Pr{ ( ) }
Pr{ ( ) | ( ) }Pr{ ( ) }
( ) Pr{ ( ) } ( )i i
i
i i i
L
r r
i
L
W
W W W
q W qλ λ
∈
− −
∈
=
= = = =
= = =
∑
∑
y
y
Y y
Y y Y y Y y
Y y
Therefore, we know that 
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
Pr{ ( ) | ( , , , ) ( , , , )}
Pr{ ( ) ( , , , ) ( )}
Pr{( , , , ) ( , , , )}
Pr{ ( ) }Pr{( , , , ) ( , , , )}
i i
i
i i
i i
i n n
i n i
n n
i n n
W K C C k c c
W k c c W
K C C k c c
W K C C k c c
− −
−
− −
− −
= =
= = −
=
= = =
" "
" <
" "
" "
Y y
Y y F
Y y
Thus, ( )iWY  and 1 1( , , , )inK C C −"  are statistically independent of each other. Then we have 
1 1( ( );( , , , )) 0.ii nI W K C C − ="Y
Namely, the wiretapper cannot obtain any meaningful information about the key k  from ( )iWY .
The following theorem can be regarded as a directed consequence of the above lemma. 
Theorem 1: On a wiretap multicast network ( , )G V E= , for each wiretap set iW W∈ , if there exists a 
positive integer (1 )i i in n n λ≤ ≤ −  such that 1 2 1, , , , ( ), , ( )i in i iW Wλε ε ε f f" "  are linearly independent and 
random variable 2 ( )iWY  has uniform distribution over 2L , then the wiretapper cannot obtain any 
meaningful information about the secret key k .
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Proof: Since 1 2 1, , , , ( ), , ( )i in i iW Wλε ε ε f f� �  is linearly independent set for each wiretap set iW W∈ .
Then we know that 2( ( )) ( ( ))i i irank W rank W λ= =F F . At the same time, the random variable 2 ( )iWY
has uniform distribution over 2L . Thus, the wiretapper cannot obtain any meaningful information about 
1 1, , , nk c c −�  when he/she eavesdrops the packets transmitted on channels in iW W∈ . It follows that the 
wiretapper cannot obtain any meaningful information about the secret key k .
Next, we proceed to proving that we can construct appropriate linear network codes to achieve secure 
communication. Firstly, we need a couple of useful lemmas. 
Lemma 2: On a wiretap multicast network ( , )G V E= , let min{ ( , ) : 1, , }in maxflow s t i μ= = � . If 
| |Dq V> , then there exists a polynomial time algorithm to construct an -n dimensional linear network 
code for multicast network such that all receivers can retrieve the source message packets. 
Lemma 2 proposes a polynomial time algorithm to construct a feasible linear network code for 
multicast network is owe to Jaggi et al. [5]. 
Lemma 3: Let max{ : 1, , }in i Nδ = = � . If | |q W> , then there exist linearly independent vectors 
1, , δη η�  such that 1 1{ , , , ( ), , ( )}ii iW Wδ λ� �η η f f  are linearly independent vector sets for all wiretap sets 
iW W∈ .
Proof: For each wiretap set iW W∈ , we have i nλ < . Then it is easy for us to obtain a nonzero vector 
1 (F )
n
q∈η  such that 1 1, ( ), , ( )ii iW Wλη f f�  is a linearly independent set. Repenting this process and in the 
j-th step, where 1 1j δ≤ ≤ − . We see that 1 1, , , ( ), , ( )i in i iW Wλ� �η η f f  is linearly independent if in j≤ .
Thus we only need to get an n-dimensional vector 1 (F )
n
j q+ ∈η  such that 
1 1 1, , , , ( ), , ( )ij j i iW Wλ+� �η η η f f  is linearly independent where in j< . Notice that, for each wiretap set 
iW W∈ , we have 1 1i j nλ≤ + ≤ − , then 
1 1
1,
1 1
1,
1
(F ) \ , , , ( ), , ( )
, , , ( ), , ( )
( ).
i
i
i
i
N
n
q j i i
i j n
N
n
j i i
i j n
jn
n
W W
q W W
q q N
q q N
λ
λ
λ
= ≤
= ≤
+
−
≥ −
≥ −
≥ −
∑
� �
� �
∪ η η f f
η η f f
Since q N> , we can obtain the desired result. 
Now, it is feasible for us to deduce our result. 
Theorem 2: On a wiretap multicast network ( , )G V E= , the collection of sets of wiretap channels is 
1 2{ , , , }NW W W W= � . For each wiretap set iW W∈ , there is an integer (1 )i i in n n λ≤ ≤ − . Let 
1 1, , nc c −�  are the cryptograms of 1 1, , nx x −� , respectively. And all random variables 1 1, , nC C −�  have 
uniform distribution over F rq . Then secure communication on ( , )G V E=  is achievable if 
max{| |,| |}Dq V W> .
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Proof: According to Lemma 2, there exists a decodable linear network code for the multicast network. 
From Lemma 3, there exist n-dimensional linearly independent vectors 1, , δη η"  (where 
max{ : 1, , }in i Nδ = = " ) such that 1, ,η " 1, ( ), , ( )i in i iW Wλη f f"  are linearly independent for all 
wiretap sets iW W∈ . Extending 1, , δη η"  to a basis 1 1, , , ,δ δ +η η ξ" , nξ"  for (F )nq . Let 
1
1 1( , , , , , )nδ δ
−
+=Q η η ξ ξ" "  and set e eQ′ =f f  for each channel e E∈ . Thus, for every iW W∈ , we 
have 
1 1
1 1
( , , , ( ), , ( ))
( , , , ( ), , ( ))
i i
i i
n i i
n i i
W W
W W
λ
λ′ ′=
Q η η f f
ε ε f f
" "
" "
Since the matrix Q  is invertible, it follows that 1 1, , , ( ), , ( )i in i iW Wλ′ ′ε ε f f" "  is linearly independent. 
It is manifestly that random variable 1 2( , , ) ( )in n iC C W− QF"  has uniform distribution for each wiretap set 
iW W∈ . From Theorem 1, we know that the wiretapper can not obtain any meaningful information about 
secret key k . Since the cryptosystem is secure, then the wiretapper is unable to extract any useful 
information from 1 1, , nC C −"  about the source message packets. Therefore secure communication is 
available. 
4. An Example 
In the section, we will present an example to illustrate the application of our conclusion. Consider the 
CSWN show in Fig.1. The message packets 1 2 5, F rx x ∈  uniformly and independently generated at source 
node s . The sinks 1t  and 2t  want to recover the source message packets and each channel carries one 
packet in 
5
F r  per unit time. The wiretapper has access to two channels in 
1 1 2 1 3 2 4 2{( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )}v t v w v w v t . We employ a confidential cryptosystem to encrypt the message packets 
1 2,x x  and produce cryptograms 1 2,c c . We assume that 1c  and 2c  are independently and uniformly 
generated. Furthermore, the cryptogram space is the same as message space. Then we can build the 
message vector m  as 1( , ,k c=m 2 )c . The network code is defined as below. 
1 1 1 1 2 1 3
2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 1
3 3 2 3 3 3 4 2
1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
3 2 2 1 2 2 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) 3
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 2
s u u v u v u v k
s u u v u v u v u v c
s u u v u v u v c
v t k c
v w w t w t k c c
v w w t w t k c
= = = =
= = = = =
= = = =
= +
= = = + +
= = = + +
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y
Y Y Y
Y Y Y 2
4 2 1 2
3
( , ) 3 4
c
v t c c= +Y
So the matrices formed by global encoding kernels of channels in 1( )I tΓ  and 2( )I tΓ  are
1 2
3 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 2   and  1 2 3 .
0 1 3 1 3 4
t t
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
M M
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It is quite manifestly that 
1 2
det( )det( ) 0t t ≠M M  , hence the network is decodable. Since any pair of 
vectors taken from 
1 1 2 3
, , ,
0 1 3 4
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
 are linearly independent, it follows that the wiretapper cannot 
obtain any meaningful information about secret key k . On the other hand, the secure cryptosystem ensures 
the wiretapper can't get any useful information from the cryptograms. 
5. Conclusion 
Combining cryptographic method with network coding, we present a secure communication scheme on 
wiretap multicast networks. Comparing with the approaches in [2][4][7], our scheme can utilize network 
capacity more efficiently. Although we employ a symmetrical cryptosystem to encrypt the message 
packets, we don't require a private channel to transmit the secret key. Moreover, we prove that we can 
design appropriate network codes to render the wiretapper to fail to obtain the secret key. 
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